Three heads of one history: presidency as a reality mirror
Feodor Lukjanov, the editor-in-chief of magazine " Russia in the global policy "
Twenty years ago, on June, 12th, 1991, in Russia the first president &mdash has been selected; convincing majority of votes victory on elections was gained by Boris Yeltsin. It has predetermined events of the subsequent MTH and became the definitive precondition of fast disintegration of Soviet Union. Against the weakening allied CTR and the president of the USSR QIK losing a support of Michael Gorbachev which and has not dared to go at direct elections, public voting has obviously given to Yeltsin qualitatively other level of legitimacy. In the conditions of split of a society and becoming aggravated race for power this factor became solving.
But if in the country it was already clear where the bowl of scales on international scene the president of the Russian Federation was not conceived as the person of Moscow till the autumn is declined. Only after August putsch and a landslide collapse of the Soviet state design in September - November friends and colleagues Gorbachev from among world leaders have realised that the president of Soviet Union more supervises nothing. Since then its president possessing under the Constitution the huge power became a symbol of Russia. And that it is more important, personifying century tradition of Russian autocracy according to which the person of the governor leaves an indelible mark on a policy of the state or at least on its perception external counterparts.
the Cliche and the surrounding validity
Three presidents of Russia - Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev - so strongly differ from each other on character and psychological type that to temptation to consider country foreign policy through a personal prism it is almost impossible to confront. A cliche ABT Yeltsin (depending on an ideological position of the author — The westernized liberal or the impulsive petty tyrant), Putin (antiwestern aggressive avtokrat), Medvedev (constructive, but dependent or the continuer of a line on « national change ») Define descriptions of the Russian international behaviour not only in sphere of mass media, but also in many publications applying for scientific judgement.
Meanwhile more fruitful point of view would be opposite - not how the person of the president formed a surrounding reality and as objective conditions forced the head of the state to behave so. In this case the Russian foreign policy looks if and not consecutive at least much more complete, than it is considered to be. Three first presidency - time of formation of Russia as international subject.
To be saved in world politics
Boris Yeltsin`s Administration operated in the conditions of incessant crisis — that political, economic. 2DAY already very few people remembers that the new Russian power had to solve basic questions urgently. Opravopreemstve the USSR (differently, ABT legal status of Russia in the world), ABT the nuclear weapon — in the Russia and behind its limits, ABT an establishment of relations W neighbouring countries, practically each of which represented then not so much state, how much the name, but W immediately declared « national interests ». The Foreign policy of the Russian Federation could not be continuation of the Soviet line as the USSR though abided during last period in a disintegration status, remained not simply great power, but also one of two support miroustrojstva. Russia wanted to inherit velikoderzhavnost, but carry out function of a system support it could not, and did not want.
Actually, in it (if not to press in bright, but minor details) the foreign policy maintenance of presidency of Boris Yeltsin consisted: Not to admit a full collapse of the status and to save - at least formally - Russia among leading world players. The last has not been guaranteed at all, EVN for a constant armchair it was necessary to be overcome in the UN Security Council.
Performance of this problem provided three components. Internal political stabilisation - from here hard-fought battle for the power W suppression of political opponents in October, 1993 and the Chechen war which political sense was to stop a powerful impulse territolnogo the disintegration, set by wreck of the USSR. Near abroad normalisation - assistance to the termination of civil strifes and support fragile gosudarstvennostej which crash 2 was capable to revive an aforementioned impulse. Iimitatsiju an active role of Russia in the world — at first (at Kozyreve) at the expense of attempts to join in « civilised community » Then (at Primakov) at the expense of presence at all possible international formats (without dependence from ability to influence decisions made there) and position demonstrations on NE questions.
the Purpose « to be saved in world politics » has been reached, however by the end 1990 - h years it became clear that it is necessary to fill the withheld formal status with the maintenance — economic and political. Otherwise against the next internal dissonances the question on capacity of Russia will rise again, and, considering the weariness which has come 2 that MOM from Moscow leading world players, external forces, possibly, any more would not began to stand on ceremony W unsteady « a bear ».
to Fill the status
Vladimir Putin`s Presidency basically it was devoted to it — convertings of the nominal status of great power in real possibilities on international scene. As well as at Yeltsin, tried « And caress, and taskoj ». At first there was an aiming at integration into the western institutes, first of all European. To a vpervoj half 2000 - h Putin persistently offered the West « the big transactions » — strategic and power, expecting to build in Russia the European and Euroatlantic community on it is comprehensible conditions equal in rights. Owing to different circumstances anything from this did not leave, and the second part of the Putin presidency the Munich speech became which embodiment, should show I Will sink down irritation its inability to agree.
Time of presidential board of Putin has coincided with the extremely rough period on international scene - the course of events has started to deviate more and more the foreordained way, forecasts of end HH of century have ceased to come true, and the behaviour of players became more and more not co-ordinated. In these conditions Putin`s spirit on consolidation of possibilities of Russia - both internal, and external — was quite rational choice. However, emotions and the feelings which have collected at the second president concerning the western partners, in any MOM have started to break apropos and without cause that only aggravated the general sensation razdraja.
pressure Explosion has occurred in two MTH after Vladimir Putin`s leaving from a state post of the head - the Caucasian war became, as a matter of fact, an overdue point of its mandate.
much wider, than usually, support of military intrusion into neighbouring country in the Russian society reflected feeling of a psychological revenge for almost 20 years of geopolitical deviation. Simultaneously events of August, 2008 became end of the Post-Soviet period overcoming of shock from disintegration of the USSR was which essence.
to Restrain and wait
to Dmitry Medvedev the transitive MOM has dropped out. The former agenda is settled, new does not appear. Against the emotional both energetic predecessor the smiling and quiet third president looks positively. However its coolness means more likely a waiting attitude, than readiness for new joint undertakings. Medvedev`s time — an epoch of accelerated erosion of the international institutes and QIK redistribution of world influence from the West on the East. Contrary to a popular belief which unconditionally writes down Medvedev in westernized camp, all is more difficult. It (as, BTW, and Obama in America) the first « postevropejsky » the president, that is the leader 4 whom Europe has ceased to be a reference point. Not casually summits Russia — EU which at Putin always something yes drew ATTN, at Medvedev have turned to empty routine. Partly from - for a cock-a-hoop in the European Union, but partly and from - for losses of interest to partnership from Russia. Geography of visits of Dmitry Medvedev too much more diversifitsirovana, than at predecessors.
the Image and a problem
It is remarkable that public images of ANY1 of three presidents of Russia precisely correspond to historical mission which it dropped out. Picturesque Boris Yeltsin who EVN the known weaknesses personified something very Russian and unrestrained, should BAM not allow to the basic partners to 4get about presence of Russia on a world scene. Guarded and as though always ready to respond Vladimir Putin responded to blow to a problem of strengthening of positions 4 compensation suffered before losses. Correct and polite Dmitry Medvedev - the head of the period of waiting and minimisation of risks from unpredictable external development. In the latter case, truth, from - for non-standard dualisticheskoj systems of the power Medvedev`s image represented only a part of the Russian foreign policy, against its mentor continued to be guessed.
the Following presidential term as it will last six years, promises to become fatal 4 Russia. It will not be time of definitive self-determination and a choice of a way to the future. On the contrary, next years the phase of definitive disintegration of former structures and a possible train of regional crises in which chaotic development will pour out is necessary. The president of the sample 2012 - should operate 2018 under the medical slogan « do not do much harm » first of all avoiding risks and only then estimating where to play sharply and dared.
Boris Yeltsin preferred game sports. Vladimir Putin LUVs the power. Dmitry Medvedev as SPK, is inclined to concentration of yoga. Proceeding from external circumstances, the person W mentality of the chess player now is required. Possible coincidence to someone from public politicians I ask to consider especially casual.