Default 1998ã. It was possible to avoidthe Economic crisis 1998ã., after which has passed almost 10 years, became a serious lesson for Russia. The huge public debt of the Russian Federation, the low world prices for the raw materials making a basis of export of the country, and also populist economic policy of the state and building of a pyramid of state credit obligations (the state short-term obligations) were default principal causes.
Following instructions VB and IMF, the management of Russia has definitively undermined economic health of the superstate which have got in the inheritance. The default on an internal debt became last point in an economic course of Post-Soviet democratic elite.
“ the external economic conditions were very adverse: the oil barrel cost about 10 dollars, gold and exchange currency reserves (ZVR) were absent, and there was a sharp budgetary hunger, - marks on air - TV in the program “ the Capital “ The vice-president of Association of regional banks of Russia Alexander Handruev who has left at own will from a post of the vice-president of Bank of Russia still till August 1998ã. - However I had a distinct impression that it was man-made crisis which could be avoided. No necessity for a public debt default existed. And all problems have arisen from - that the rouble exchange rate was is artificial is overestimated “.
As experts of the Time commission of the Federation Council on default investigation 1998ã mark., a pyramid of state credit obligations in 1998ã. Any more did not represent a source of financing of budgetary deficiency. In connection with amplifying debt crisis investors have rushed to deduce capitals from state credit obligations, buying up currency. Central Bank possibilities on exchange rate deduction have been settled and, as consequence, insolvency of the government is announced. “ If crisis could not be avoided, at least, it would be possible to soften it, - marks headed Bank of Russia after August 1998ã. Victor Gerashchenko. - it was necessary (it was offered still in 1996ã.) To enter a certain limit on foreign investors into state credit obligations is it was necessary to do in the spring “.
Questions are caused also by legitimacy of use of state credit obligations basically: placing of the given obligations was conducted with unfairly high profitableness (to 140 % annual), and short term of repayment did not add stability to this tool which represented a classical pyramid with the known end. “ there was a misunderstanding of a management of the financial block in the government, there was no understanding and at a management of Bank of Russia, - adds A.Handruev. - then we have offered the country for the sake of interests of separate oligarchical groupings “.
As experts Time the commission of Council of Federation, the decision from August, 17th 1998ã mark. Prepared the Government of the Russian Federation without corresponding consultations of the Russian experts, but “ consultations of heads of the foreign financial organisations having the interests in the Russian financial market " were conducted;. Let`s notice that at sessions of the Time commission of Council of Federation on investigation of the reasons of a default have refused to act the prime minister who was at that time - as the minister Sergey Kirienko (nowadays the head of Rosatom), well-known Anatoly Chubays, the special representative of the president of the Russian Federation on foreign economic relations in a rank vitse - a premiere from June till August 1998ã. (For today, on termination of Russian Open Society reform “ EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY “ - the unemployed) and many other responsible for a default 1998ã. Persons to whom public accusations in national treachery have actually been brought.
“ the country leaders, the government at that time tested euphoria, - remembers V.Gerashchenko. - the western uncle Here will come and to us will help. It was promised 14 mlrd dollars from IMF, VB and even Japanese should participate in any programs “.
“ Most likely, the administrative team did not understand, in what consequences will result made decisions, - general director Ingosstraha Alexander Grigoriev, in August 1998ã marks. Heading Mezhkombank. - oil was the fundamental factor which influenced deficiency of the balance of payments and a budgeted deficit. But after all at a budgeted deficit live and the same USA flourish. Not only at a budgeted deficit, but also at a huge external public debt and military expenses “.
Speaking about crisis lessons 1998ã., A.Grigoriev marks: “ the Government, the state during crisis should protect interests of the country. Not to follow recommendations of external advisers at which the interests, the system of balances and motivations, and accurately to motivate interests of the country. The main interest of the country - well-being of the population. And in 1998ã. The population " became the main victims;. Anyway, the majority of lessons of August 1998ã. It is taken, the expert considers, adding that in Postyeltsin Russia many doubt till now efficiency of the monetary authorities.
“ today, despite ostensibly formal financial well-being, there is a number of problems. The first is, of course, inflation, - the director of the Center of strategic researches of Bank of Moscow Alexey Vedev marks. - I doubt that we can lower at the expense of toughening of a monetary policy rates of inflation, and here rates of manufacture we will lower “. According to A.Vedeva, the basic lacks of the Russian government consist that it always prepares for the last war. “ and I at all do not see measures which could be used in case of the future crises “.