Sergey Karaganov: Russia and the USA can manage the friend without the friend
Russian - the American relations develop radically in the international conditions different not only from times “ cold war “ but also from the followed transition period. This new situation is characterised by parametres following, in particular:
- the General falling of controllability of the international relations. They again renatsionalizirujutsja, the states return again themselves the central role in them.
- there Is a fast shift of the centre of world politics and economy from evroatlantiki to Asia and Pacific region. Also the vector of the basic interests of the USA there moves.
- distribution of the nuclear weapon Has begun. Process, probably, already neostanovim. The question costs about its restriction and regulation. The space round Persian gulf, the Central Asia and the Near East became the most problem region in the world from the point of view of the international safety last years.
- Failures of the USA at Bush, the success of China, foreign policy easing of Europe, a world economic crisis open new postgegemonistsky not western stage in the international relations.
These and a number of other circumstances have qualitatively weakened world positions of the USA which can be restored only partially. The USA remain the most powerful country of the world, but with sharply weakened possibilities to spend the interests unilaterally, depend on others much more.
Russia, having restored after a collapse of the end 90 - h the statehood and sharply having increased thanks to a favorable conjuncture in the world markets and in world politics the political power and influence, has reached, on - visible, limits of this growth the next years. World economic conjuncture and nereformirovannost the Russian economy and a society call into question into preservation possibility even a modest Russian share in 2,5 % of world GNP which the country has reached in 2008.
the Analysis of the major interests of Russia and the USA, the vis-a-vis each other, the SWAP spent under aegis and RIA Novosti news agency in frameworks “ the Valdai club “ allows to come to a conclusion: the main interests lie not in sphere of mutual relations, and in relations with the third countries (for the USA - problems of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq; for Russia - Georgia, Ukraine, a number of other countries of the former USSR) or concerning the international problems, mentioning both parties (distribution of weapons of mass destruction, a problem of power safety, a climate, etc.) .
Thus Russia is in most cases capable to block achievement of the USA their major foreign policy purposes. The USA can stir Russia for bolshem quantity of directions.
Thus, both parties have raznomasshtabnyj, but a comparable potential of drawing of a foreign policy damage each other.
Thus from the spent comparative analysis of interests it is found out that they only in places are directly opposite. Generally very often they are or in different planes, or have cardinally excellent weight for the parties. So, among the vital interests of the USA are registered: maintenance of worthy leaving (with ostavleniem a symbolical contingent) from Iraq, prevention of defeat in Afghanistan and country stabilisation, prevention of disorder of Pakistan and control loss over its nuclear weapon. And first of all a non-admission of reception of the nuclear weapon Iran menacing by a collapse military - political positions of the USA in all key for them Near-Eastern region.
Russia is not interested in destabilization of Afghanistan, in control loss over the nuclear weapon of Pakistan or in acquisition of the nuclear weapon by Iran. But its interests in these spheres on one or two levels below the American.
Among the vital interests of Russia - preservation de - fakto prevailing influence on territories from Belarus to caucasus, an expansion non-admission on these regions of alliances of other countries. Such expansion threatens including a train of conflicts, and even the big war.
In this sphere interest of the USA is less or even is opposite.
Thus both at Russia, and at the USA a lot of parallel, though and not always conterminous interests. First of all, in adjustment stable miroustrojstva, in prevention of uncontrollable distribution of weapons of mass destruction. And especially, as distribution has begun, in its restriction, in adjustment of system of multilateral restraint of new nuclear powers, in granting of guarantees of safety to other countries to avoid chain reaction. Similar level of interest and in counteraction to the international terrorism, especially catastrophic.
Any of the key problems facing them, the countries have no possibility to solve without assistance another.
* * *
From “ cold war “ the followed period of attempt of an establishment of the American domination, and then odnostoronnosti times of J. Bush the parties have inherited the highest level of a mutual distrust, especially strong from the Russian side.
In the Russian elite the belief prevails that the USA have used the Russian weakness 1990 - h years and even tried to prolong it. And ratovanie for democracy there is only a cover for creation of conditions that those or other countries followed by the subordinated development in the tideway of the American geopolitical interests. Besides, the widespread belief was developed that any displays of a pliability, constructibility, good will do not bring any benefits, and are only swallowed and kindle appetite. The most part of the Russian elite does not see any pluses in initiative adjustment of constructive relations from the USA. Only very small part sees indirectly - long-term pluses from the point of view of modernisation of the country, consolidation of its geopolitical positions.
In the USA the disappointment that Russia has not gone on a pro-American way is available, there are hopes, think, illusory, on returning in case of new Russian easing to model of mutual relations 1990 - h. Mistrust to the political system which has developed in Russia Is available also.
the Saved up potential of mistrust and suspicions is hard for overcoming. Not ordinary political will, creation of effective channels of interaction are necessary.
And the most important thing. It is necessary to find the effective mechanism of interface of interests.
* * *
Now both in Russia, and in the USA is the circles opposing rapprochements or considering that the countries can manage the friend without the friend.
But these circles thin from - for obvious inadequacy of their positions to realities. For this reason in the USA not only president Obama, but also a number of rather influential groups of ruling class began to support “ reboot “ Russian - the American relations. The tool of this “ reboots “ restriction of strategic offensive arms is chosen up to movement to minimum levels of nuclear arms and even - in distant prospect - to nuclear “ zero “.
At the reached level of a mutual distrust attempt to use it “ the old reliable weapon “ it is clear. But this tool obojudoostr and even can bring more problems, than decisions.
the Comparative analysis of interests of the parties in nuclear sphere convincingly testifies: they only partially coincide, and are in many respects simply opposite.
Coincidence - in understanding of necessity of a support on the nuclear factor in the conditions of quickly changing and more and more astable world.
interests in prevention of unapproved use of the nuclear weapon (the chance on which is insignificant) or hits of the nuclear weapon in hands of terrorists (which probability increases from - for possibilities of disorder of Pakistan, the North Korea, distribution of the nuclear weapon across the Near East) Coincide. But for Russia it is interests of the second order.
the Divergence - and cardinal - in vision of the nuclear weapon from the point of view of country safety. For Russia safety without a support on the powerful nuclear factor is impossible.
For the USA - reduction and even liquidation of the nuclear weapon at the technological on foreseeable prospect technological and quantitative superiority in conventional armaments - is desirable and it is favourable.
It is available the serious conflict of interests.
Besides, in nuclear area restart of mechanisms of restriction of arms is fraught with revival of mentality of military opposition of the past which has left. But can be extended on a surface in case of an excessive support on reduction of nuclear arms. As, as it was marked above, interests of the parties in this sphere are in many respects opposite.
Thereupon readiness of Russia for improvement of relations mainly on the offered channel of the auction in the field of strategic armaments causes alarm. Especially from - for absence of counter ideas. It seems that in Moscow simply do not know what to do, miss the initiative.
We, probably, assimilate drunk of a joke which searches for the lost keys not there where it could lose them, and under a lantern, there, where is light. Besides under that lantern in which to it have specified.
* * *
Process of restriction of strategic armaments needs to be continued, certainly. But with extreme care. It is not capable to provide real “ reboot “ relations. Moreover, it can provide such “ reboot “ when on the screen Russian - the American computer much of the worst will return that has been saved up in these relations for years of military opposition.
it is necessary to head for maintenance not simply “ reboots “ and their real change-over. And it is necessary to operate already now, by preparation for a meeting Medvedev - Obama. For this purpose it is necessary to address to radical interests of the parties and to try to reach the historical compromise, “ the big transaction “ in the beginning not issued publicly, having exchanged respect of interests of two parties in areas where they are really vital.
From Russia exchange, probably, would demand, in particular, all-round support of efforts of the USA and the NATO in Afghanistan (besides direct military involving); Co-ordinations of a policy concerning Iran if also it becomes nuclear (except support of senselessly rigid sanctions or military intrusion); supports of efforts in Pakistan and Iraq, rapprochements of positions in Near-Eastern settlement; refusal of restoration of a zone of the historical influence by power methods (over Abkhazia and Ossetia).
From the USA exchange should include effective support to signing of the new all-European contract on collective safety which would finish de - fakto “ cold war “ in Europe, proceeding in the soft form; the termination of expansion of the NATO; refusal of support of the Antirussian forces and modes in territory of the former USSR. The contract could become public registration of the historical compromise.
the Compromise could include qualitative expansion of cooperation in power sphere and the termination there an open antagonism; Interaction in sphere of problems of global nuclear safety, a climate, the foodstuffs, many other global problems.
Within the limits of this interaction opened for others China (within the limits of the concept offered by influential Chinese theorists " could play a growing role; tripartite “ leaderships China - the USA - Russia in the international organisations, in adjustment of the international cooperation, in the decision of some global problems). Where probably it should be involved and incorporated Europe within the limits of other triangle: Russia - the USA - Europe.
it is clear that on the majority of problems of world development Russian - the American interaction cannot play a key role. Some problems of the party will solve the friend without the friend, competing or even competing.
But prevalence of rivalry over cooperation does not provide even radical interests of the parties.
It is necessary to search for possibilities “ restart “ Round them, and in the long term - even creation close though and limited, strategic interaction and even - paternal not to dream - the union.