The euroharm countries
Why in Germany there were too many factories and factories, in Spain — it is too much houses, and in Greece — it is too much state employees? The reason — in euro. While the eurosummits will not be replaced by divorce cases of member countries, this grotesque disbalance will amplify only.
next, the eighteenth on June, 28th has come to the end for last three years, the anti-recessionary European summit. It should put an end to debt crisis. Judging by sharp growth of world exchange platforms, it was possible. However, initial reaction of the markets to the previous resolute statements too was positive. Sobering up and comprehension of that has really occurred, came then. And still progress is. If to understand as it vybivanie from Berlin all indulgences for " Latin Europe ".
It decided to consider the problem on creation of uniform supervising body in bank sphere by the end of 2012. After its creation the European jug European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will have an opportunity directly rekapitalizirovat problem banks. If, truth, reaches before: mandate ESM assumes odalzhivanie money to the problem countries, instead of banks. Moreover, rekapitalizatsija banks at the expense of ESM assumes not odalzhivanie money to banks (the additional debt will not improve position with their capital), and, most likely, purchase of their actions. Their shareholders the first will have in loss up to full zeroing of the price of actions.
as soon as the German tax bearers will reflect on consequences, the attraction of unimaginable generosity of Berlin will stop. And can, and will not begin. New functions ESM, most likely, will demand repeated ratification by parliaments, differently ESM can be blocked the constitutional courts. We will not forget, as creation of uniform supervising body a problem hard. In general, as always, at eurobureaucrats " There is a plan on plan creation on rescue of euro and the further eurointegration ". A leah
Costs ovchinka manufactures? What sense in eurozone preservation at any cost? A leah is steady system " " Latin Europe " against Germany " or " seven with a spoon, one with soshkoj "? No. The eurosummits only delay an eurozone agony, eliminate symptoms, instead of illness. Creation of an eurozone has not reduced, and has only increased a disbalance in Europe. And the longer euroofficials will think out compromises, the definitive rupture will be more sick.
why the eurozone is impractical? The euro reflected as the tool of convergence of economy, and the return is now observed: the euro contributes in decomposition of Europe. The euro became the mechanism of long-term loss of competitiveness in all countries PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) and has simultaneously allowed Germany to increase the competitiveness. The euro has appeared on a hand only and without that to the strong economy of Northern Europe focused on export, and to the weak peripheral countries only has done much harm.
Why? In - the first, euro introduction was carried out with the overestimated exchange rate of national currencies of the countries of periphery. It has led to their decrease and without that to low competitiveness.
in - the second, economy of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece were characterised by traditionally high rates of inflation, interest rates, high level of a budgeted deficit and a high state debt (except Spain). Before introduction of euro they have been urged to finance deficiencies of budgets under the high interest rate corresponding to high inflation.
and the European banks financing Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece, faced currency risk: pesetas, drachmas and lyres regularly devalvirovalis rather steadier dojchemarki. It kept banks from crediting of economy PIIGS. Euro introduction has eliminated this currency risk (as it has appeared, not for ever).
the Intermediate result of introduction of euro became demand growth on gosobligatsiii PIIGS in the middle of 2000 - h and, accordingly, decrease in interest rates. Also crediting in a private sector of europeriphery, the rate under corporate bonds simultaneously has sharply grown and under credits to the population also have sharply decreased. All it against confidence that quality of political and economic institutes and srednedushevye incomes in countries PIIGS will soon be made even to corresponding indicators of the North European economy.
in the market of state bonds has occurred " great convergence ": the credit risk of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece seemed to investors (first of all to banks) comparable to credit risk of Germany. Plus to that there was a confidence that if any problems at europeriphery in the future will arise, other members of an eurozone will be urged to offer a helping hand. And about possible currency risk (that is about redenominatsii debts from euro back in pesetas, lyres and drachmas) anybody even did not reflect. The introduction into an eurozone seemed the one way ticket, mechanisms of an exit from an eurozone has not been provided.
banks were built in turn behind purchase " bezriskovyh " peripheral bonds which gave hardly the big profitableness, than the German papers. And the governments of these countries with pleasure have found out what to finance budgetary deficiencies in the conditions of uniform currency it became much cheaper and easier, than earlier. The motivating to deficiency and state debt reduction has disappeared: what for them to reduce, when state papers scatter as hot pies? Artificial reduction in price of the credit has led not to alignment of economic indicators in an eurozone, and to the contrary, to strengthening existing even before introduction of uniform currency of a disbalance.
in - the third, uniform interest rate ETSB became the additional factor of strengthening of a disbalance. On periphery of Europe the rate of inflation and in 90 - e, and in zero was above, than in Germany and in other developed economy of an eurozone. That before the introduction into a government eurozone were ready to do anything (including on statistics falsification as in a case with Greece), to adjust the macroeconomic indicators to the Maastricht criteria has not helped also.
accordingly, uniform rate ETSB was high (Germany) for one countries and too low, stimulating credit bubbles, for others. For Greece and Spain it was even below a rate of inflation. And it led to that real rates of crediting (the nominal rate a minus inflation) in countries PIIGS throughout enough long periods appeared negative.
For the countries where decades the credit was expensive, it suddenly became inexpressibly cheap suddenly. About a god-send! Demand Spanish, Irish and, let to a lesser degree, Portuguese and Greek (the state there had more a good time) households and business on credits has strongly grown. It has led to an advancing rise in prices and demand for the goods which were not a subject of international trade, has forced up the prices for habitation, forming in the peripheral markets all conditions for occurrence of boom of real estate. In parallel there was a sharp growth of salaries in comparison with labour productivity, especially in sector of services, building and a state sector. At the same time the export share in gross national product volume remained at former level, and import and deficiency of the balance of payments in the conditions of availability of foreign loans, on the contrary, have sharply increased.
demand which has sharply increased on credit feed for import from party PIIGS simultaneously has created an additional impulse for development and without that powerful export sector of Germany, the basic which trading partners basically the same countries of an eurozone. Germany made the " Mercedes " " Volkswagens " " Audi " " Porsche " dredges and building cranes, the German banks willingly bought the state in reliable euro state and corporate bonds, financed a private sector of the peripheral countries actually for purchase of production of the German exporters. False demand has called rough, but too false growth of the industry in Germany.
But peripheral economy did not become ustojchivee. To the contrary, low interest on nominated in stable and nizkoinfljatsionnom euro to state bonds, corporate bonds and credits to private business and the population has created conditions for grotesque in comparison with 90 - mi a disbalance. The banquet has ended together with crisis 2008 - 2009 when crisis deficiencies PIIGS of budgets have expanded to a disgrace, and the real estate bubble has burst.
investors have again understood that the currency risk anywhere has not got to, and even has grown: the euro became again a potential fan from pesetas, drachmas, lyres, dojchemarok. Banks have suddenly started to consider credit risk of the countries of an eurozone separately great convergence of profitablenesses of state bonds has evaporated. And still there were too many houses in Spain and Ireland, and in Greece it is too much state employees (in France, by the way, too). And certainly, debts state and private have grown. Well and in Germany there were too many factories and factories for service of false demand of its hopeless debtors which it is necessary to rescue, rescue and more time to rescue.