the end to mobilisation?In the first days after resignation of Serdjukova journalists and analysts more or have less in detail stated results of activity of the former minister. As one would expect, all have concentrated on made Serdjukovym reductions. Really, for 4 years have been dismissed about 130 thousand officers and about 100 thousand ensigns and warrant officers. The quantity of parts and connections of Armed forces has been resolutely reduced. Reductions in Land forces &mdash were the most striking; from 1187 parts and connections remains only 189. In the Air Forces 72 aviaregiments have been shown in 14 air bases. In reduction fleet were too rather considerable. The structure of Armed forces has changed also. The brigade (in the Air Forces &mdash became the basic army connection instead of a division; air base). Instead of six military districts has appeared four incorporated strategic commands. For the first time under the general command Land forces, aircraft and air defence, and also forces of fleet have been shown.
and still for the first time for 300 years of existence of regular army army commanders have been separated from notorious " economic activities ": on them responsibility for a food of soldiers, heating of barracks and other does not lie any more. All it is assigned on " Oboronservis " the organisation which has appeared now in the CTR of the corruption scandal which has become the cause 4 dismissal by Serdjukova. Occurrence " Oboronservisa " has released commanders not only from cares of repair of technics and staff service. Them have released and from control over monetary streams that was pleasant not all from officers.
here this transfer also limited those who has tried to inventory " the inheritance of Serdjukova ". And it is not casual: Reformers long enough diligently avoided EVN a word " reform " being afraid that attentive analysts will C something bolshee, than reductions. They long insisted that it is a question only of elimination certain " disproportions " resulted disorder of the Soviet army. With that end in view it is necessary supposedly it is necessary to liquidate simply neboegotovye parts and connections of incomplete structure (and them there were already 80 percent from an aggregate number) yes to get rid of superfluous number of officers (on two private soldiers one commander had).
AAM and neboegotovye connections in which ministered on 500 officers and only on one hundred soldiers, and the huge quantity of captains and majors were not any " a disproportion ". They were an important and natural element in system of mass mobilisation army. The matter is that within last 150 years to provide country defence it was supposed by means of mass mobilisation of reservists. In Soviet period in " the threatened period " the authorities intended to call " under banners " from the citizen B4 8 million persons.
the same concept based plans of defence of Russia prior to the beginning of reform. " superfluous " officers were necessary to become commanders of regiments and battalions of reservists. " Kadrirovannye " (and, certainly, neboegotovye) divisions were necessary to accept these reservists and to provide with their arms. War W Georgia in 2008 - m has shown that this concept in present conditions — no more than fiction. The most part of tanks and the armoured troop-carriers deduced from bases of storage, simply is not has reached South Ossetia. And colonels who have served all life in parts of incomplete structure, simply refused to conduct military units as were not able to order in fight.
Serdjukov W this fiction has refused to be reconciled. It has put an end to mass mobilisation army. It has been declared, what EVN in case of war 4 defence it is required no more than 700 thousand reservists. And it instead of millions which planned to call more recently. If serdjukovskaja reform makes success, it would mean not only cardinal revision of defensive strategy. As a matter of fact, this reform decisively changed mutual relations of the citizen and the state. CUZ all last 300 years masters of Russia (that reign that secretaries general that presidents) looked at the citizen first of all as on the potential soldier. And inhabitants of the country have been assured that there can not be other system of a state system, than that at which the power can call at any moment the inhabitant in army and thus not to bear exactly any responsibility for his life. If this communication was torn, the militarism, one of the major bases of the present Russian state, would be doomed to inevitable destruction.
On a question, leah Serdjukov its associates understood also, on what they attempt, we already never will RCV the answer. No less than there is no answer to a question, a leah its dismissal has been called by that the authorities have made out threat to the base institutes in reforms of army. However it is obvious that in process of development of reforms all of them in bolshej and bolshej degrees came to the contradiction W requirements of the Kremlin 2 Armed forces.
one million — BAMFirst of all in the field of acquisition of the Russian army. Was considered as one of the main positive results of reform that all parts and connections of Armed forces have RCVed the status of constant readiness and, if to believe promises of a management of the Minister of Defence, could be put forward 4 performance of a fighting problem in some hours after order reception. It meant that parts and connections, at least, are completed by staff on wartime states. And 4 expansion reservists are not necessary to them.
However calculations of reformers have quickly enough come to the contradiction W requirements by all means to save number of Armed forces in one million military men. The demographic situation is that that it is impossible basically: annually only hardly there are more than 600 thousand young men reach 18 years. And 4 preservation of million number it is necessary to call annually about 600 thousand. That is under a gun it is necessary to tyre out all: and students, and those to whom health does not allow to minister. That basically it is impossible. But heads of the Minister of Defence have not risked to explain it to a supreme commander in chief. After all already now number of our army makes something between 700 and 800 thousand military men. Further the situation will worsen only.
meanwhile staff states in brigades are confirmed from calculation of million number. As a result already now in army contrary to reform shortage of staff was formed. And connections AGN neboegotovy as it was in 90 - h years of the last century. That though as - that to solve a problem, inform mass-media, in ANY1 brigade now are created batalonnye groups of constant readiness. Precisely such batalonnye groups in ANY1 landing division created during the second Chechen war. If to mean that as a part of Land forces is only about fifty obshchevojskovyh brigades it turns out: all defence of the country keeps 2DAY only on 50 battalions of Land forces. Plus seven battalions of constant readiness Air - landing armies. And it actually all forces which will be at the disposal of the Kremlin in case of any a swagger - a major situation.
escalating of quantity of contract employees could be an exit here. As it is known, the Ministry of Defence assumed to type annually on 50 thousand military professionals on soldier`s and serzhantskie posts. As a result of their aggregate number should reach 415 thousand. And one of the most important problems which Shojgu, &mdash face; to make the decision on acquisition of Armed forces.
reequipment — threat to reformsOther problem — it is attempt to execute the ambitious program of reequipment in cost 23 trln roubles. The Russian defensive industry is not ready to executing it. That is money will be, of course, mastered and spent, but here that as a result the army will RCV the planned quantity of planes, rockets and tanks, — more than doubtfully.
till now it is not possible to adjust manufacture of element base 4 difficult military technology. In Soviet period all element base was made for difficult arms at the civil enterprises which had so-called mobzadanie (2 market economy this, clear business, could not have any relation basically). In 90 - e years these enterprises either were closed, or reorientated. As a result, contrary to loud promises of heads domestic VPK, any batch production of military technology they to begin not in a status. For that simple reason that are urged semihandicraft way to make element base at factories of final assemblage. How much money enclose in such manufacture, the cost price " will grow only; products ".
All it, I will repeat, all participants of process fine understand. But recognise it cannot. Wherefore then it is necessary to tell: the ambitious program of reequipment in cost in 23 trln roubles is executed cannot be. EVN this huge money will not suffice on building high-grade industrial cooperation on manufacturing of all spectrum of arms — from pistols B4 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Such cooperation cannot be adjusted within the limits of the huge collective farms called by state corporations. In these collective farms it is impossible to adjust effective manufacture: Incomes of one will be redistributed in favour of bankrupts. However hardly someone will risk to call into question into the decisions made by a high management. Therefore heads VPK live by a principle — one day we live. As Igor Ashurbejli rather recently heading one of the largest corporations " has declared; Diamond - Antej " directors of factories agree on orders, to execute which obviously not in a status.
Serdjukov could not declare directly that the created system basically is incapable of a batch production of arms. But thus he did not want to bear responsibility that huge means will be dissipated W/ O any result. And consequently persistently clashed with representatives of war industry, trying to force to prove the price for products, to make that technics which is necessary to military men, instead of that which is favourable the industries. It is not excluded, what exactly this conflict and became the original reason of dismissal of Serdjukova. Leah
Will understand Sergey Shojgu W this inheritance? No doubt, it — the nice person most, perhaps, in the present power. Ready to incur the responsibility, possessing organising abilities and huge experience. Among its indisputable merits — creation of the Ministry of Emergency Measures. From the Soviet armies of civil defence where decades sent the at fault officers, he has created the real case of rescuers, people proud of the trade, motivirovannyh and self-assured. It would be desirable to hope that the new head of military department QIK will understand W an event, can confront with those generals who sleep and C curling of reforms. However it is impossible to exclude that the course of events at which the new minister like should follow any new policy, will force it to be engaged in alteration of that is already not bad made. More than possibly that the generals muttering on corners of last 4 years, will try to use a situation and to convince Shojgu and Putin that the way offered by Serdjukovym, is erroneous. That it is necessary to return 2 old Soviet model. That it is possible to jump over a demographic hole, having increased term of involuntary service B4 two, and about three years are better. Alas, about one reform in Russia never it is impossible to tell that it has passed a non-return point.